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Savignac, "Interpr6tation de Proverbes VIII 22-32," SVT, XVIl 
(1969)~ 196-203. 
McKane has plowed new furrows and overthrown firmly established 
views as a result of painstaking research. No scholar or serious student 
of Pr can afford to neglect this commentary. Many of the conclusions 
will have to be reckoned with. This work is indispensable. 
Andrews University GERHARD F. HASEL 
Miller, David L. Gods and Games: Toward a Theology of Play. New 
York: World Publishing Co., 1970. xiii + 209 pp. $ 5.95. 
David Miller frolics through this book insisting that play is serious, 
but theologians saying so are playing. Five sentences from three 
successive paragraphs in the last chapter illustrate this: "If a book 
purports to witness to life lived sub specie ludi, perhaps then there 
should not be a serious word in the whole book. . . . I seriously hope 
there is not one serious sentence in the whole of this book. Including 
this last one. . . . The danger with a book like this one is that someone 
might take it seriously. Or that the author might take the preceding 
sentence seriously" (pp. 170, 171). Frankly, it is a little difficult to 
take David Miller seriously, and I mean it. 
Somehow Miller got diverted into spending well over half his book 
on introduction; not a typology of previous comments on play, or 
a searching analysis of their work, but an annotated bibliography on 
everyone who has mentioned play from Wittengenstein to Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstem-46 authors in seven widely diverse fields (including 
mathematics). Still, it may be the most useful part of the book. At 
least none of the authors writing on theology of play do the same 
thing. In the last half of his book, Miller surveys what anthropologists 
and psychologists write about play being a central characteristic of 
man, and even defining what phenomenologists and theologians say 
about religion as play. The topic has been discussed in greater depth 
by Robert Neale and Sam Keen. 
The point that Miller stresses more than Neale, Keen, or even 
Harvey Cox is that theology of play should be playful. "A theology of 
play, by play, and for play," is the formula he propounds. Why ? Why 
should a theology of play be any more playful than other theologies, 
especially if play is as significant as Miller proposes ? Should theologies 
of faith be pious, theologies of hope ecstatic, and theologies of love 
erotic ? Theology by definition is reflection. Its purpose is to clarify 
feelings, actions, thoughts. If a religious person wishes to reproduce 
in others a quality of his experience, he will probably break into poetry 
or song. Instead of theology he will involve himself in devotional 
literature and liturgical practice. Theology and liturgy are both 
needed, sometimes they can even overlap, but to demand that a theo- 
logy of play must hop, skip, and jump means that careful reflection 
may well be sacrified to a forced ebullience. 
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Miller himself is sometimes superficial, other times inconsistent. 
He connects the word play with many other words. He describes play 
as the sense of pleasure, by which the "meaning comes through the 
interplay of the senses" (p. 141). But he also says that the language of 
a theology of play is witty, full of puns, joke-like (p. 161). But is humor 
necessarily the language of pleasure ? Aren't play and humor related, 
but distinct ? And what about joy ? Repeatedly he describes the play 
of children as joy. They experience a joyful sense of freedom and unity. 
In his introduction, when Miller describes the purpose of his book, he 
invokes the word joy. "It is a quest, not for a serious theology about 
play, but rather for a playful theology about seriousness-in fact, 
about Ultimate Seriousness, which is Joy" (p. 5). What then is the 
relation of play to pleasure, to humor, to joy ? Clearly, they are related, 
but how ? Miller enthuses about all of them, but does not clarify their 
relation to each other. 
On whether play is essentially individual or corporate Miller is 
inconsistent. He emphasizes that in Anglo-Saxon the word pflegan 
meant not only play, but pledge. In the process of trying to emphasize 
the seriousness which the word play has connoted in the past, Miller 
reveals an ethical dimension inherent in play. To play is to be with, 
and therefore concerned about, others. Later, in his analysis of the 
psychology of play, Miller separates play in general, found in infants, 
from game-playing begun in the late childhood and adolescence. 
Activity within rules, within regularized concern for others, is not 
play. "Games may well seduce us into purposiveness. Into wanting 
to win something. But play: that is a different matter. Play is purpose- 
less" (p. I 74). m e n  Miller comes to describe religion as play he sees no 
reason for play to be directed outward toward other people. "To refer 
to play as the religion behind man's everyday existence is to imply a 
radical reformation in the history of religious consciousness. . . . Where- 
as previously man found meaning in social contexts, now he finds it 
individually" (p. 154). Miller has obviously forgotten the meaning 
that he himself reported that play had in Anglo-Saxon. Miller's religion 
as play finds no pledges to others. 
Miller's lack of clarity on the relation of play to humor compounds 
his problem here. If humor is part of play, can one persist in saying 
play is individual? Does not noticing incongruity assume attention 
to reality external to the individual ? Does not humor and wit demand 
an audience to hear the incongruity pointed out ? 
If Miller's book were the only one published on theology of play, 
we could be grateful for his a t  least reminding us that play has been 
overlooked as a place for God to be revealed. As it is, those willing to 
spend a limited time dallying with theology of play should read 
Ralph Neale, Sam Keen, or Harvey Cox. 
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